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Labour demand and wage effects of takeovers that involve employee 
layoffs 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Research motivation 
The issue of whether mergers and acquisitions lead to economic efficiency is divisive, as is 
confirmed by mixed empirical evidence. There is no general agreement on the dominating motive 
for such transactions. Consequently, the sources of takeover gains are unknown.  Synergy 
realisation and management disciplining have been suggested as the main driving forces of 
efficiency improvements. However, it is not well understood how such factors may create value. 
One suggestion is that better labour management and more efficient labour usage reduces demand 
for labour during post-takeover years (Conyon et al., 2002). Profit maximising managers may 
undertake workforce reductions to realise the synergetic and better labour management gains 
created by mergers. However, any workforce reduction should be undertaken on the basis of the 
level of decline in labour demand. This implies that decline in labour demand should be steeper 
in mergers that involve employee layoffs than in mergers that do not.  
To contribute to the growing body of literature on the employment effect of takeovers, 
this chapter empirically investigates the following three interrelated issues. First, recent empirical 
studies show that mergers significantly reduce labour demand (Conyon et al., 2002; Gugler and 
Yurtoglu, 2004). The question is: what factors lead to this decline in labour demand? One reason 
for this post-merger labour demand reduction could be the fact that mergers may create market 
power (Stigler, 1950). With this enhanced market power firms reduce the output and raise 
product prices, to increase their profitability using lower levels of input. Alternatively, improved 
labour productivity has been suggested as one of the main reasons for post-takeover workforce 
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reductions. Labour productivity could be improved through elimination of duplicative facilities 
(synergy) and/or better labour management (discipline). There is some empirical support for both 
synergetic and disciplining sources of efficiency improvement. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) 
argue that the main reason for efficiency improvement is management disciplining, as targets 
were poorly-performing plants and their performance is improved significantly after mergers. 
McGuckin and Nguyen (1995b) conclude that one of the important motives of mergers could be 
synergy, as acquired plants were well-performing companies before acquisition and they further 
improved their performance after acquisition. Conyon et al. (2002) report that related and hostile 
acquisitions increase efficiency post-merger, as such acquisitions cause large falls in labour 
demand, in comparison to unrelated and friendly acquisitions, respectively.     
To contribute to this literature the chapter investigates whether post-merger demand for 
labour to produce the combined output is lower in merging businesses than in non-merging 
businesses. We analyse the effect of mergers on labour demand, holding output and wages 
constant as well as controlling for firm-specific fixed effects and industry-wide changes. We 
assess synergy and the disciplining role of takeovers by investigating the labour demand effect of 
related versus unrelated and hostile versus friendly mergers. We also investigate whether merger-
related employee layoffs can be linked to the fall in labour demand arising from efficiency 
improvement.  
As a main question of interest, this chapter investigates whether there is any relationship 
between decline in labour demand and reductions in the absolute number of workers post-merger. 
In other words, we are interested in understanding whether managers undertake employee layoffs 
on the basis of decline in labour demand. If decline in labour demand is the major factor in this 
decision-making process, then mergers that involve employee layoffs should lead to a different 
level of decline in labour demand from that in mergers that do not.  
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To empirically examine this issue we divide the full sample into two sub-samples 
depending on whether an acquisition involves employee layoffs, on the basis of employee layoff 
information reported in newspapers: the ‘layoff’ sub-sample (hereafter ‘layoff’ acquisitions), 
which includes acquisitions that involve merger-related employee layoffs during two post-
takeover years, as reported by newspapers, and the ‘non-layoff’ sub-sample (hereafter ‘non-
layoff’ acquisitions), which includes acquisitions that do not involve employee layoffs. Data on 
the merger-related employee layoffs is collected by screening major national newspapers. On the 
basis of this data, we use a ‘layoff’ dummy to investigate the difference in the labour demand and 
employment cost of ‘layoff’ and ‘non-layoff’ acquisitions.  
Finally, a related question is: what is the wage growth effect of mergers that involve 
employee layoffs? Efficiency enhancement relating to labour usage should significantly improve 
firm profitability, as suggested by the positive feedback mechanism of labour demand (Vietorisz 
and Harrison, 1973). In turn, improved firm profitability may also benefit employees, among 
other stakeholders, through increased wages and better work conditions. Therefore takeovers 
should benefit employees by proportionately increasing their share of the rent (assuming that 
there is a fair bargaining mechanism within the businesses). Thus, increased labour productivity 
and firm profitability should eventually benefit employees through wage increases, better work 
places and pension schemes. In this regard, the chapter investigates whether wage growth in 
merging firms is different from wage growth in non-merging firms. Mergers may lead to 
efficiency improvement in labour usage, which could be achieved through synergies (for 
instance, elimination of duplicative activities) or by instituting better labour management. Thus, 
mergers may also affect wages by improving employee profitability resulting from decline in 
labour demand. Decline in labour demand should also benefit employees.  
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In sum, understanding the issues of whether there is a merger-related shift in labour 
demand is the key factor in understanding the motivations behind corporate takeovers. However, 
there is very little empirical evidence on this issue. An innovation of this chapter is that it 
attempts to link decline in labour demand with the reduction in the absolute number of workers. 
With this evidence the chapter also contributes to a better understanding of the objectives of the 
decision-makers in undertaking these transactions.  
1.2 Related literature and hypotheses development 
1.2.1 The effect of ownership change on labour demand 
Although both theoretical and empirical research on mergers and acquisitions are well 
established, there is no widely accepted theory that explains the labour market outcome of such 
corporate transactions. Merger theories are inconclusive on the link between ownership change 
and labour market outcome. The value-creation theory of takeovers predicts that takeovers will 
negatively affect jobs in the short run, although the long-run effect depends on the 
complementarities of the merging businesses and success of the merging business. In contrast, 
the value-destruction theory predicts that takeovers should not negatively affect employment 
levels in the short run, but in the long run such takeovers could destroy jobs, as businesses 
eventually decline due to bad management. The value-redistribution theory predicts that 
takeovers will negatively affect employment by causing the implicit contracts to be breached 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988).  
As discussed above, one of the main motives of mergers and acquisitions is to achieve 
efficiency improvement through economies of scale and scope. Economies of scale could be 
achieved through altering the input – output relationship in the production process. One of the 
main inputs that can easily be altered to extract more synergetic gains is the labour input. As 
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summarised by Conyon et al. (2002), if merged businesses require a different optimal 
employment level from that produced by simply combining the individual workforces, then any 
profit-maximising firm will need to adjust its employment levels during the post-merger period. 
Recent empirical results indicate that mergers cause significant rationalisation in the use of labour 
and the authors interpret this as being consistent with the value-creating theory of takeovers 
(Conyon et al., 2002, 2004; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004).  
In contrast, efficiency improvement and better asset performance under the new 
ownership may create new jobs and lead to better work conditions (Holmstrom, 1988). Using 
plant level data from the US food industry, McGuckin et al. (1998) show significantly higher 
employment growth (16%) for an average acquired plant in comparison to an average non-
acquired plant. However, when firm level data is used this difference between acquired and non-
acquired firm employment becomes insignificant. Using the OLS method, McGuckin and 
Nguyen (2001) report that ownership-changing plants increase their workforce 19% (3.3% when 
the IV estimation method is used) faster than plants having no ownership change. However, there 
is a size effect: non-ownership-changing larger plants (plants in the top 15 percentile of the size 
distribution) increase their labour force faster than larger ownership-changing plants.   
Post-merger workforce adjustment does not need to occur instantaneously and the speed of 
movement to the new equilibrium depends on the costs of this adjustment. In addition, the type of 
workforce adjustment (increase or decrease) depends on the returns to scale of the production 
technology of the combined firms. If the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale, 
then mergers should not change output and employment levels. If the production technology 
exhibits increasing returns to scale, then the merged firm should be able to use a smaller amount 
of combined labour to produce the output amount equal to the combined individual outputs of the 
merging firms. However, the merged firms may not achieve this synergy instantaneously and 
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labour adjustments may take several years to achieve the new equilibrium, meaning that the 
effect of takeovers on labour and the labour output relationship could be dynamic. We test the 
following hypothesis:    
Q4-H1. Takeovers reduce demand for labour, as merged businesses gradually achieve synergy 
and improve labour management. 
Early studies consider employment and wage growth in merging firms relative to non-
merging firms and conclude that mergers improve labour productivity (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 
1990; McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001). However, one limitation of these studies is that they do not 
investigate the factors that may lead to such efficiency improvements. Furthermore, these studies 
consider all ownership change as homogenous. More recent studies suggest that synergy or 
management disciplining may improve labour efficiency and therefore they investigate the labour 
demand effect of related versus unrelated, and hostile versus friendly mergers (Conyon et al., 
2002; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004).  
The scope of synergy, and the subsequent value created by takeovers, differ depending on 
the relatedness of the merging businesses. If related businesses merge, then there are more 
opportunities for achieving synergies and a greater level of cost savings by eliminating 
duplicative activities. Consequently, related takeovers lead to a higher increase in productivity 
than unrelated takeovers (Rumelt, 1974). Therefore it is reasonable to expect that related 
acquisitions may lead to a higher level of decline in labour demand and a subsequent higher level 
of workforce reductions, as confirmed by recent empirical research (Conyon et al., 2002; Gugler 
and Yurtoglu, 2004).  
As there is more scope for synergy in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions, it 
is possible to achieve higher levels of labour demand reduction in the former than in the latter. 
Therefore the labour demand effect of takeovers should be more pronounced in related 
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acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions. Hence we classify mergers in terms of relatedness 
(related versus unrelated) to test the following hypothesis: 
Q4-H2. Decline in labour demand is greater in related acquisitions than in unrelated 
acquisitions. 
Similarly, the management disciplining theory also predicts staff downsizing, possibly in 
the auxiliary establishments and among white-collar staff. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) 
distinguish between the effects of takeovers on auxiliary establishment employees and production 
establishment employees. In ownership-changing auxiliary establishments employment declines 
by 16.7%, while in production establishments this reduction is only 4.5%. As hostile takeovers 
are associated with management disciplining, it is reasonable to expect that such takeovers 
improve efficiency more than friendly takeovers do. Similarly, we expect labour productivity to 
be higher after acquisitions involving employee layoffs than acquisitions not involving workforce 
reductions.  
Recent studies distinguish between related and unrelated takeovers as well as between 
hostile and friendly takeovers. The Conyon et al. (2002) results indicate that related mergers 
cause significantly higher labour usage rationalisations than unrelated mergers. Rejecting the 
popular proposition that hostile takeovers lead to job destruction and wage cuts, Conyon et al. 
(2001) report that both hostile and friendly takeovers reduce demand for labour at the same level 
(7.5%). However, the reduction in the absolute number of employees is significantly higher after 
hostile takeovers than after friendly takeovers, as such takeovers are followed by substantial falls 
in output as a result of divestments and other types of asset re-sale, as reported by Haynes et al. 
(2000). In addition to this, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) report that mergers reduce employment 
even after controlling for divestments and these authors confirm the US versus UK differences 
described above in the employment effect of mergers: in the US mergers do not adversely affect 
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employment, while in Europe employment declines by 10% and in  the UK in particular 
employment declines by 12% during the merger year
1
. Therefore we test the following 
hypothesis:  
Q4-H3. Decline in labour demand is greater in hostile acquisitions than in friendly mergers. 
1.2.2 The association between decline in labour demand and workforce reduction 
Cappelli (2000) argues that one of main reasons for post-merger workforce reduction is the 
decrease in labour demand. According to this argument, there should be a link between decline in 
labour demand and reductions in absolute number of employees post-merger. In other words, 
decrease in labour demand should be greater after ‘layoff’ acquisitions than after ‘non-layoff’ 
acquisitions. However, no study has compared the labour demand and wage effects of these two 
types of acquisitions.   
Briefly, in contrast to the view that a substantial proportion of takeover gains comes from 
labour restructuring, such as employee layoffs and wage cuts, the recent research shows that 
mergers cause labour productivity improvement. However, it is unclear whether merger-related 
                                                 
1
 Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) suggest that such a differential effect of mergers is the result of 
‘sclerotic’ and rigid labour markets in the EU countries. In the EU, labour markets are regulated 
more strictly than in the US and therefore firms have higher labour adjustment costs in the EU 
than in the US. Different labour adjustment costs in the EU and US imply that mergers and 
acquisitions have different effects on labour demand in these economies. Specifically, mergers 
result in higher levels of employee layoffs in the EU than in the US, as  in the US firms can 
continuously make labour adjustments to optimal levels and do not need to use mergers and 
acquisitions for this purpose. 
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employee layoffs lead to labour productivity improvement. For example, McGuckin and Nguyen 
(1995a) report that ownership-changing plants experience improvement in labour productivity, 
measured as relative labour productivity (RLP), where this improvement is not necessarily related 
to the employment reduction
2
. Using the same sample with plant level data, McGuckin et al. 
(1998) provide evidence indicating that employment increases by 16% and labour productivity 
increases by 16% in a typical acquired plant.   
Under an active market for corporate control, synergy or better labour management 
should reduce post-merger labour demand. Acquirers should undertake employee layoffs 
depending on the changes in labour demand. We investigate whether decline in labour demand is 
greater in acquisitions with employee layoffs than in acquisitions that do not involve layoffs. We 
also investigate the differences in employee profitability and the wage effect of takeovers in the 
‘layoff’ and ‘non-layoff’ sub-samples. 
Q4-H4. Decline in labour demand is greater in the ‘layoff’ acquisitions than in the ‘non-layoff’ 
acquisitions. 
                                                 
2
 In the literature labour productivity is defined as the ratio of output to the number of employees, 
output being measured as either value-added in the production process or value of shipments 
(sales value). As the value-added measure is not always available, usually in practice sales value 
is used to proxy for output. However, price differentials among different firms and inflation over 
time do not allow reliable comparison of labour productivity among different firms. Therefore 
some studies use the Relative Labour Productivity (RLP) measure, defined as the ratio of an 
individual firm’s labour productivity to average industry labour productivity.    
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1.2.3 The effect of ownership change on wage growth 
A related issue is whether this improvement in shareholders’ wealth (high profitability) is at the 
expense of other stakeholders, for example, employees. In their seminal paper Shleifer and 
Summers (1988) argue that mergers may reduce wage growth by eliminating extra-marginal 
wage payments through layoffs of older workers. Several empirical studies provide evidence 
supporting this argument. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) find that wage growth in ownership- 
changing auxiliary establishments is 9.2% lower, while in production establishments wage 
growth is 2.1% lower than in non-ownership-changing production establishments. Thus, these 
authors conclude that ownership change diminishes wage growth, although the relative wage 
decline in production establishments is only about one third of that in auxiliary establishments. In 
contrast to this, McGuckin et al. (1998) find that a typical acquired plant increases its workers’ 
wages 12% faster than a non-acquired plant in the US food industry. McGuckin and Nguyen 
(2001) report that for the entire US manufacturing sector ownership change causes a 4.2% faster 
increase in wages for workers at a plant of average size. But there is an inverse relationship in the 
case of larger plants: wages increase faster in large plants that undergo ownership change. 
Ownership change in bigger plants negatively affects wage growth: a typical worker in bigger 
acquired plants has lower wage growth in comparison to other workers in non-acquired plants. 
Thus, even if the wage effect of takeovers is positive for a worker of an average size typical 
plant, its effect may not be positive for a typical worker, as most people work in large plants. 
More recently, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) have provided evidence showing that tender-based 
takeovers reduce employment by about 8% in the US, while mergers do not change employment. 
These authors interpret this as being consistent with the ‘breach of trust’ hypothesis.  
However, in contrast to this, it can be argued that improvements in firm-level efficiency 
should also benefit employees, among other stakeholders. As a result of elimination of 
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duplicative activities and better labour management, mergers may cause efficiency gains, which 
should be manifested in firm performance improvement. Both synergy and management 
disciplining theories postulate that mergers should improve firm performance. Both decline in 
labour demand and increase in labour productivity may lead to a higher level of profitability per 
employee. For example, Conyon et al. (2004) suggest that post-merger labour efficiency causes 
change in firm profitability (measured as the profit per worker). In the UK Conyon et al. (2004) 
report that the ceteris paribus impact of acquisitions on wages is positive: mergers increase 
wages by 11% within two years after mergers. Thus, these authors argue that merger-related 
restructurings boost employees’ share in the business rent as well. 
On the basis of this discussion, we predict that, along with the owners, the employees of 
merged firms will also be able to benefit from the overall performance improvement in the form 
of better wage and work conditions. Firms with an increasing market share and improving labour 
productivity may achieve higher levels of profitability. Strong unions may be able to increase the 
employees’ share of the rent through higher levels of wages. As Conyon et al. (2004) suggested, 
wages may increase due to increased profits, even if  the wage formation process does not 
change. Thus there may be two possible sources of wage change in merged firms. Mergers may 
change firm profitability, which in turn leads to the change in wages. Alternatively, mergers may 
simply cause a change in the wage formation process. Thus, we test the following hypotheses 
regarding the wage effect of mergers:  
Q4-H5. Wage growth is higher in merged firms than in non-merging firms. 
Q4-H6. Wage growth is higher in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions. 
Q4-H7. Wage growth is higher in hostile acquisitions than in friendly mergers. 
Q4-H8. Wage growth is higher in ‘layoff’ acquisitions than in ‘non-layoff’ acquisitions. 
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1.3 Data and methods 
1.3.1 Econometric modelling 
In modelling the labour demand effect of takeovers, we follow the strategy adopted by previous 
research (Conyon et al., 2002, 2004; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004), which uses a model developed 
on the basis of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Specifically, to test hypotheses Q4-H1, 
Q4-H2, Q4-H3 and Q4-H4, the following model will be estimated: 
itiititititititit vDqqwwll    615413211      (6.1) 
where itl  is the logarithm of employment, itw  is the logarithm of real wage relative to user cost of 
capital
3
, itq  is the logarithm of real output of firm i in time t, tD  is a dummy variable, taking one 
of the following four dummies: merger, relatedness, hostility and employee layoffs. The merger 
dummy takes 1 if firm i is involved in a merger at time t and 0 otherwise, the relatedness dummy 
takes 1 if both target and acquiring firms are in the same industry and 0 otherwise, the hostility 
dummy takes 1 if the management of the target company rejects the initial offer made by an 
acquirer and 0 otherwise, and finally the layoff dummy takes 1 if acquisitions involve employee 
layoffs and 0 otherwise; i  indicates time constant firm-specific unobservable variables, that will 
be removed after first differentiation using panel data
4
; itv is the usual error term.  
The above equation only indicates the contemporaneous impact of mergers on labour 
demand. To investigate the long-run effect of mergers on labour demand we include lagged levels 
                                                 
3
 User cost of capital is assumed to be equal to one to provide comparability across firms. 
4
 In econometrics the above model is called an autoregressive-distributed lag model, the 
estimation methods of which are discussed in the methodology chapter of this thesis.  
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of the dummy variable. For example, 1itD takes 1 if firm i was involved in a merger at time t-1 
and 0 otherwise and 2itD takes 1 if firm i was involved in a merger at time t-2 and 0 otherwise.  
To test the above hypotheses we use four types of dummy variable in different estimations. First, 
we use a Merger dummy that differentiates merged firms from control firms. Second, we use 
Related and Unrelated merger dummies that differentiate post-takeover changes in the 
performance of these types of merger from the changes in the non-merging control firms. Related 
mergers are classified as those mergers where both acquired and acquiring firms are in the same 
industry, while unrelated mergers indicate those transactions that involve firms in different 
industries. Third, we use Hostile and Friendly merger dummies. Hostile takeovers indicate those 
takeovers where the initial bid was rejected by the incumbent managers. Finally, we use Layoff 
and Non-layoff dummy variables, where the Layoff dummy indicates those acquisitions involving 
layoffs of more than 1% of the combined workforce within two years after completion of 
transactions, as reported by the newspapers
5
. 
                                                 
5
 To be considered as a layoff acquirer, a firm should layoff at least 1% of the combined 
workforce during a two-year period. If no information is found on layoffs, then we assume that 
none have occurred. Out of 235 sample acquirers 101 (43%) acquirers made merger-related 
layoffs, on average laying off about 7.5% of the combined workforce. The mean number may be 
biased downwards, because companies may not disclose all layoffs or reported data in the 
newspapers may be incomplete. Alternatively, acquiring firms can be classified into ‘layoff’ and 
‘non-layoff’ firms, on the basis of merger-related layoff information, collected from newspapers, 
as in Krishnan et al. (2007) and Hillier et al. (2007). In this regard, we collect data from 
newspapers on merger-related layoffs undertaken during the two-year period after takeovers, by 
screening all major national and regional newspapers, downloaded through Nexis®. We find a 
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The basic issue underlying equation (1) is whether changes in takeovers have a significant 
effect on employment, controlling for changes in wages and output. Bresson et al. (1996) derive 
the optimal level of employment conditional on the changes in expected output and the wage to 
capital ratio. In this regard, to isolate mergers’ effect on labour demand the model includes both 
one period lagged level and contemporaneous sales and wage variables, as the labour demand 
changes could occur due to the changes in these variables. Wages should be relative to user cost 
of capital and it is common in the relevant literature to assume that the cost of capital remains 
constant over time and therefore to be equal to one for all companies. As discussed above, labour 
demand adjustment may not be instantaneous, but may occur gradually, meaning that there may 
be a time lag between the merger event and labour demand adjustment. Labour demand may also 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
strong positive correlation between newspaper-reported layoffs and year-to-year workforce 
change, reported by Datastream (34%). However, the size of  workforce reductions reported in 
the press is smaller than the Datastream reported size. One explanation could be the fact that 
managers are reluctant to publicise the true scale of workforce reductions, as this may affect the 
market value of their company. Both Krishnan et al. (2007) and Hillier et al. (2007) suggest that 
the measure of layoffs reported by the press is more precise than year-to-year changes in 
employment levels reported by databases as the latter may include the effect of divestments or 
asset disposals. However, although layoffs reported in the newspapers are more relevant, they do 
not give the full picture of workforce changes. All workforce reductions may not be reported in 
the newspapers or all announced layoffs may not actually materialize, providing a measurement 
bias, as suggested by Shah (2007). 
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depend on lagged output and wages. Therefore it is customary to include lagged variables, also 
called initial variables: last year’s variables are the most important predictors of current year 
variables. By including the lagged variables we control for the full history of the right-hand size 
variables, so any new shock in the dependent variable comes from the takeover event.  
In equation (1) the main interest is the coefficient of the dummy variable 6 , which 
indicates the contemporaneous effect of mergers on labour demand. Where lagged dummies are 
used, the merger dummies indicate the effect of mergers on employment after one and two years 
respectively. To support the above hypothesis, we expect negative coefficients for these merger 
dummies.  
This estimation directly tests whether the changes in profitability are caused by the 
increased labour productivity and reduced labour demand. This can be linked to the basic 
discussion of the economic role of mergers in improving efficiency.    
To test hypotheses Q4-H4, Q4-H5, Q4-H6 and Q4-H7, the following model will be estimated:  
itiititititititit vDpkliwww    651413211    (6.2) 
where itw  is the logarithm of wage rate per worker in firm i in time t, itiw is the logarithm of firm 
i average industry wage in time t, itl is the logarithm of employment, itk is the logarithm of capital 
per employee in firm i at time t, itp is the logarithm of profit per employee, itM is the post-merger 
dummy variable that takes 1 in all three post-merger years, tD is a dummy variable (as explained 
above). To investigate the long-run effect of mergers on labour demand up to three period lagged 
dummy variables will be included in the above equation.  
As a result of post-takeover operating performance rationalisation, elimination of 
duplicative activities and cost savings, mergers may cause efficiency improvement, which should 
be manifested in a performance improvement. As discussed above, the value creation theory of 
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takeovers (synergy and management disciplining) postulates that mergers improve firm 
performance. Both the decline in labour demand and increase in labour productivity may lead to a 
higher level of profitability per employee. For example, Conyon et al. (2004) suggest that post-
merger labour usage efficiency causes change in firm profitability (measured as the profit per 
worker). In the models we include profitability per employee a measure of firm performance.   
As the change in wages may be conditional on the alternative wages, we include an 
industry average wage to the model. Wages may change due to changes in employee profitability. 
Therefore we include employee profitability as well as interaction of this variable with the 
merger dummy. Conyon et al. (2004) show that wage changes in merging firms are strongly 
associated with profitability changes. Vietorisz and Harrison (1973) discuss the positive feedback 
theory of the labour market, which postulates that high wages cause adoption of labour-saving 
innovations, that lead to high productivity and a further increase in wages. On the other hand, low 
wages cause the persistence of more labour-intensive techniques that lead to low labour 
productivity and wage stagnation. This contrasts with the negative feedback theory of labour 
markets, which predicts that high wages will lead to the adoption of capital intensive techniques, 
reducing labour demand and wages. Arai (2003) reports that wages are positively correlated with 
both profits and capital intensity after controlling for a number of other variables. Therefore we 
also control for capital intensity. Finally, the dummy variables indicate the contemporaneous 
effect of mergers (also classified as relatedness, hostility and employee layoffs) on wages. To 
analyse the long-term effect of mergers we also include lagged levels of the dummy variables.  
The above models are autoregressive lag models, which include the lagged level of the 
dependent variable (employment and wage) and therefore the error term may be correlated with 
the explanatory variables. The model includes the lagged dependent variable, because the 
employment and wage effect of mergers may not be instantaneous, but may follow a dynamic 
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adjustment process. One of the main characteristics of the above autoregressive distributed lag 
models is that some or all explanatory variables may be correlated with the error term due to the 
presence of the lagged dependent variable and unobservable variables, which may affect both the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables. Examples of unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity in this research context could be such variables as firm i management performance, 
its overall workforce quality or unique customer relations. Such unobservable variables are 
usually time-invariant and allow for heterogeneity in the dependent variables across observations. 
For example, the management quality unobserved variable is negatively correlated with other 
inputs in the above models and positively correlated with the output variable, since a high quality 
management will probably result in more efficient use of inputs and achieve a higher level of 
output. Another reason for the correlation of explanatory variables with the error term is that the 
relationship between dependent variable and independent variable could be simultaneous: the 
output may explain the employment level but, at the same time, employment levels may explain 
output. The third reason is that there may be some measurement error in the variables
6
 used.      
                                                 
6
 In addition to the above, there may be simultaneity in the model: the merger dummy may be 
correlated with the error term: prior performance of merging firms may determine the occurrence 
of a takeover event. McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) argue that plant productivity and ownership 
change positively correlated, whereas Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) argue that plant productivity 
and ownership change are negatively correlated. In addition to this, the merger event may itself 
negatively affect the employee work attitude and this may start to negatively affect performance. 
The pre-merger productivity measure and wage levels may also influence the probability of the 
merger event itself, and it is possible that the merger indicator itself may be endogenous. For 
example, the McGuckin and Nguyen (1995b) results indicate that plants with high productivity 
19 
When explanatory variables are correlated with the disturbance term OLS estimates are 
inconsistent. In this case pooled OLS is subject to the same omitted variable bias as OLS in the 
single cross-section. First differencing eliminates unobservable firm-specific fixed effects, but it 
introduces another problem: the first-differenced lagged dependent variable may be correlated 
with the differenced disturbance term. Therefore, following Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and 
Arellano and Bond (1991), we use Instrumental Variables estimation, using lagged levels and 
lagged differences of all explanatory variables as instruments. As our dataset includes more than 
three time periods, the efficiency of the estimates could be improved by using two or more 
periods lagged variables as instrumental variables. Thus, we use a systems generalized method of 
moments (GMM) technique to estimate the above models, using both two and more periods 
lagged levels and lagged first differences of all available periods as instruments, as suggested by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000). Harris et al. (2005) use the systems 
GMM approach to analyse the effect of management buyouts on economic efficiency.  
All three variables in the model - employment, wage and output - are considered as 
endogenous variables, as they are determined in the system. Efficient firms with good labour 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
were the most likely to experience ownership change, Therefore previous research also uses 
estimated probabilities of merger events as an instrumental variable to proxy the merger dummy 
variable, estimated on the basis of a panel probit model. However, the results of using both 
merger dummy and probability of merger event are qualitatively the same. Because of data 
limitations, we use only the merger dummy variable.      
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organisation use lower levels of employment and achieve higher levels of sales. The previous 
literature indicates that wages are different even within industries: wages may be historically high 
in some firms. For example, Krueger and Summers (1988) report that unexplained wage 
differences exist among firms even within the same industries with similar financial indicators. 
Therefore  we use lagged levels and lagged differences of these variables as instrumental 
variables, as suggested by the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000) systems 
GMM estimation methodology
7
. The one-step systems GMM estimation method uses two-year 
and earlier lagged levels as well as lagged differences as instruments for the endogenous 
variables. This estimation method corrects for simultaneity and allows us to control for firm-
specific fixed effects by first differencing, and then it instruments the differenced variables with 
their own two or more period lagged levels and lagged differences. One of the main assumptions 
of using the instrumental variables estimation method is that there should be first order serial 
correlation between the error terms, but not second order serial correlation. These assumptions 
are tested using Arellano–Bond tests for the first AR(1) and second AR(2) order serial 
correlations in first differences. In addition, the validity of instrumental variables is tested using 
the Hansen test of over-identification restrictions
8
. We also control for changes in macro-
                                                 
7
 In addition to the one-step systems GMM, we also experiment with the two-step systems GMM 
estimation methods, because this method corrects for small sample bias. In this case the 
coefficients are smaller. However, Windmeijer (2005) argues that two-step systems GMM 
estimates can be invalid due to small sample biases. Therefore we base our discussions on the 
one-step systems GMM estimation results. In the latter case, the coefficients are smaller. 
8
 The Sargan test usually over-rejects, when it is used with the heteroscadesticity robust option. 
Therefore we use the Hansen test.  
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economic factors by including time-dummies and for industry wide differences by including 
industry dummies
9
. 
1.3.2 Data 
This chapter uses the same sample and data as that described in Chapter 5. In addition to this we 
collected data from national newspapers on merger-related employee layoffs in order to more 
precisely measure the employment effect of mergers, following the methodology adopted by 
prior research (Hillier et al., 2007; Krishnan et al., 2007). In particular, we collected data on 
takeover related workforce layoffs undertaken during the two-year period after takeovers, as 
reported in the public media. To collect this data we screened all major national and regional 
newspapers, downloaded through Nexis
®
. To be considered as a layoff acquirer, an acquiring firm 
should lay off at least 1% of the combined workforce during the 2- year period after the takeover 
completion date. If no layoffs are reported in the press, then we assume that none has occurred. 
Out of 235 sample acquirers 101 (43%) acquirers made merger-related employee layoffs, on 
average dismissing about 7.5% of the combined workforce. Using this data we classify acquiring 
firms into ‘layoff’ and ‘non-layoff’ sub-samples. 
1.3.3 Description of the variables 
This chapter uses two employment-related variables. The first variable is the number of 
employees, which represents the average number of both full- and part-time employees during 
                                                 
9
 McGuckin, R. H. & Nguyen, S. V. (2001) suggest considering the merger dummy as an 
endogenous variable, as the profitability of firms may affect the occurrence of a merger. 
Therefore they estimate the probability of a merger event by a probit regression methodology 
using several explanatory variables. However, as we do not have enough data to calculate this 
probability, we treat the merger as an exogenous dummy.    
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the accounting year, taking into consideration seasonal workers. The second variable is staff cost, 
which represents wages paid to the employees and directors of the firms
10
. It includes wages and 
salaries, social security costs and other pension costs.  
For output we use total sales. Following Conyon et al. (2004), employee profitability is 
computed by dividing annual profits by the annual average number of employees
11
. As the 
measure of profit we use Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
(EBITDA). Capital intensity is computed as the ratio of net book value fixed assets to the 
average annual number of employees. Similarly, average industry wage and average employee 
profitability for each industry is computed on the basis of Datastream information. For this 
purpose, for each industry we compute the median performance, including all contemporaneously 
                                                 
10
 The most direct test of ‘the wealth transfer’ hypotheses should be on the basis of the analysis of 
individual workers’ wages in both target and acquiring firms, using employee – employer linked 
data. However, we do not have such a dataset and therefore we concentrate on aggregate wages at 
the firm level. 
11
 Ideally productivity should be measured by Total Factor Productivity, which is defined as the 
ratio of total output to total input. However, we do not have data on total input, such as materials 
and cost of capital. Alternatively, productivity can be measured for each individual input: for 
example, labour productivity can be defined as the ratio of output to the number of employees. 
Thus, labour productivity could be measured using the ratio of value-added to number of 
employees, where value added could be measured as the difference between sales and material 
inputs. However, it is not always possible to collect an accurate measure of output and therefore 
sales are used instead. 
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listed UK firms in the same industry, defined on the basis of Datastream Industrial Classification 
Level Four.   
For the control group we selected 470 matched firms (one for each acquired and acquiring 
firm). These firms were selected on the basis of the methodology proposed by Barber and Lyon 
(1996), matching on the basis of the same industry, size and pre-takeover performance measures. 
For each sample firm we selected a matching firm at the end of year t-1 on the basis of the 
following criteria: first, we filtered all firms in the same industry with the sample firm; second, 
we selected all firms within the 25% to 200% size interval of the sample firm’s size, size being 
measured with total assets; third, we selected the non-acquiring firm with the closest EBITA 
scaled total assets to those of the matching firm.  
To distinguish the difference in performance between acquiring and non-acquiring firms, 
the matched firms should not have undertaken any significant acquisition around the sample 
takeover event which is being investigated
12
. Therefore we selected only those matching firms 
which had neither been acquired nor had made any significant acquisitions during the two years 
before takeovers or the three years after takeovers. To construct the non-merging firms’ sample, 
we selected as matching firms only non-acquiring firms that had not been involved in any 
acquisitions during the five-year period from t-2 to t+3.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for a number of variables, including mean and 
median, for merging and matching firms at the end of the last pre-takeover financial year. The 
descriptive statistics show that variables come from a non-normal distribution and are highly 
positively skewed. Therefore in the regression analysis we use log transformations of these 
                                                 
12
 However, it is unclear whether the previous studies select non-acquiring firms as matching 
firms (Ghosh, 2001, Powell and Stark, 2005). 
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variables. As the employment variable shows, acquiring firms are nearly 4 times larger than 
acquired firms
13
. 
Table 1. Workforce, wage, sales, profit and fixed assets for merging and control firms at the end of t-1  
Acquiring 
firms
Matched 
acquiring 
firms
Acquired 
firms
Matched 
acquired 
firms
Number of employees Mean 13,088        9,214          3,313          2,088          
Median 2,975          2,661          770             706             
Annual wage per worker Mean 23.04          23.12          23.33          25.30          
Median 22.11          22.60          21.58          22.80          
Sales per worker Mean 133.85        145.82        147.05        153.30        
Median 97.86          94.00          94.89          94.00          
Profit per worker Mean 26.17          23.60          22.41          20.85          
Median 12.29          11.84          9.30            10.17          
Fixed assets per worker Mean 126.04        87.55          97.02          99.26          
Median 23.57          24.88          21.26          21.86          Not
e: All financial figures are in real terms (2003 currency) and in £’000. Number of employees represents the number of both full- 
and part-time employees of the company. Profit is defined as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA). Annual wage per worker is computed by dividing the employment cost by the number of employees. Employment 
cost represents wages paid to employees and officers of the company. 
 
1.3.4 Measuring changes in the variables 
To measure the changes in the above variables, we compute a pro-forma pre-takeover variable by 
combining the target and buyer firms. For example, pro-forma combined values of employment 
and sales are calculated by combining respective values for acquired and acquiring firms.  
The  average pre-takeover wage is calculated by dividing the combined staff costs of acquired 
and acquiring firms by their combined number of employees as follows:  
BtiTti
BtiTtipre
ti
NN
WW
W


           (6.3) 
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 Other variables - sales, fixed assets and profits - also show that the acquired firms are 3-4 times 
smaller than the acquiring firms. 
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where pretiW  is pre-takeover pro-forma wage rate per employee, TtiW is i
th
 acquired firm’s staff 
cost in year t; BtiW is i
th
 acquiring firm’s staff cost in year t; TtiN is total number of workers 
employed by i
th
 acquired firm at the end of year t, BtiN  is total number of workers employed by 
i
th
 acquiring firm at the end of year t. 
Similarly, pro-forma pre-takeover values of other variables, such as profitability per 
employee and capital per employee are calculated in the same manner. Table 2 provides 
percentage changes in the employment, wages, output and employee profitability variables during 
the post-takeover years relative to the pre-takeover year (t-1). These percentage changes have 
been computed on the basis of the Brown and Medoff (1988) regression methodology, that 
includes both time and industry dummies. These results show that mergers reduce employment 
levels significantly during the merger year, but not during the post-takeover years. However, 
when the sample is split into layoff and non-layoff sub-samples, then the results show that layoff-
making acquirers significantly reduce employment levels during all three post-takeover years, 
while non-layoff-making acquirers increase their employment levels relative to the pre-takeover 
period.  
These preliminary univariate results also show that mergers cause faster wage growth 
relative to non-merging firms: wages grow 7% faster in merging firms in comparison to non-
merging firms during the three post-takeover years. Unrelated, friendly and layoff- involving 
mergers cause higher levels of wage growth in comparison to non-merging firms, whereas 
related, hostile and non-layoff mergers do not cause different wage growth.  
The results also show that in the full sample, output levels do not change during post-
takeover years. However, after acquisitions that involve layoffs, output levels significantly 
decline every year during the three post-takeover years, while after acquisitions that do not 
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involve layoffs, output levels increase every year during the three post-takeover years. These 
preliminary results indicate that employment levels decline due to the decline in output levels, 
while employment growth is a function of the output growth. 
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Table 2 Change in the main variables during the post-takeover years relative to pre-takeover level 
Post-takeover years t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3
Panel A: Change in employment relative to the pre-takeover level (t-1)
All takeovers - 0.123*** - 0.032* - 0.013 - 0.009
Related takeovers - 0.122*** - 0.041* - 0.007 0.027
Unrelated takeovers - 0.124*** - 0.025 - 0.05 - 0.078
Hostile takeovers - 0.153*** - 0.062* - 0.06 0.036
Friendly takeovers - 0.119*** - 0.026 - 0.006 - 0.013
Cash financed takeovers - 0.124*** - 0.056 - 0.027 0.024
Non-cash financed takeovers - 0.122*** - 0.026 - 0.012 - 0.026
Layoff involving takeovers - 0.181*** - 0.164*** - 0.176*** - 0.192***
Non-layoff involving takeovers - 0.069*** - 0.064*** - 0.099*** 0.135***
Panel B: Change in wage rate relative to the pre-takeover level (t-1)
All takeovers - 0.006 - 0.012 0.019* 0.033**
Related takeovers - 0.01 0.002 0.014 0.032*
Unrelated takeovers - 0.005 0.033*** 0.031** 0.039**
Hostile takeovers - 0.027* 0.044** 0.029 0.047*
Friendly takeovers - 0.001 0.005 0.018 0.031**
Cash financed takeovers 0.031*** 0.001 0.008 0.028
Non-cash financed takeovers - 0.018** 0.019* 0.025* 0.035**   
Layoff involving takeovers 0.008 0.037*** 0.030* 0.052***
Non-layoff involving takeovers - 0.015* - 0.006 0.011 0.016
Panel C: Change in output (sales) relative to the pre-takeover level (t-1)
All takeovers - 0.098*** - 0.001 0.03 0.008
Related takeovers - 0.089*** 0.011 0.026 0.036
Unrelated takeovers - 0.128*** - 0.026 0.011 - 0.066
Hostile takeovers - 0.141*** 0.018 0.009 0.071
Friendly takeovers - 0.102*** 0.006 0.032 - 0.009
Layoff involving takeovers - 0.188*** - 0.115*** - 0.144*** - 0.133***
Non-layoff involving takeovers - 0.051*** 0.083*** 0.131*** 0.067*
Panel D: Change in employee profitability relative to the pre-takeover level (t-1)
All takeovers 0.064*** 0.080** 0.084** 0.065
Related takeovers 0.096*** 0.114*** 0.161*** 0.068
Unrelated takeovers - 0.015 0.009 - 0.017 0.067
Hostile takeovers 0.061* 0.039 0.073 0.137*
Friendly takeovers 0.062** 0.083** 0.084* 0.058
Layoff involving takeovers 0.092*** 0.128*** 0.124** 0.161***
Non-layoff involving takeovers 0.048* 0.036 0.067 0.012  
Notes: The percentage mean change in the employment, wages, output and employee profitability variables have been computed 
using the Brown and Medoff (1988) regression methodology. The estimates are obtained using OLS regression. The omitted 
group is the control group of non-merging firms. The regressions include year and industry dummies. The table reports only the 
coefficients of the relevant dummy variables. 
Finally, analysis of employee profitability indicates that mergers cause 13% faster growth in 
comparison to non-merging firms, which is significant at the 10% significance level. In this 
process, related mergers cause a 21% improvement in employee profitability relative to the pre-
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takeover levels, controlling for changes in the non-merging control firms. The employee 
profitability change after hostile takeovers is also 21%, which is significant at the 10% 
significance level only. In contrast to this, employee profitability changes in layoff and non-
layoff sub-samples are not different from those in the non-merging firms.  
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Short-run impact of mergers on labour demand  
As the descriptive statistics given in Table 2 show, mergers do not cause significant changes in 
employment levels during the post-takeover years. However, as a result of materialising 
synergies or instituting better labour management during the post-merger period, labour 
productivity may change in a positive direction. For example, after some mergers output may 
increase much faster than employment growth or, alternatively, job cuts may happen much faster 
than output decline. This disproportionate change in output and labour input may subsequently 
cause change in labour productivity during the post-takeover years.   
To empirically investigate this relationship, we estimate equation 6.1. Table 3 reports the 
results of the estimation using all four dummy variables. The estimates of control variables – 
lagged employment, wages and sales – are consistent with the predictions of the dynamic labour 
theory. The current year employment levels should be positively related to the previous year 
employment levels, as confirmed by positive and significant coefficients of the lagged level 
employment, which indicates the existence of inertia in the employment levels. Next, according 
to the dynamic theory of labour, the direction of the change in the employment levels should be 
inversely related to the employment cost, meaning that the higher the required compensation for 
labour, the lower the use of labour. Consistent with this, the wage variable coefficient is negative 
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and significant. The next control variable - output - is positively related to the employment levels: 
increasing output levels require higher levels of labour input. 
Turning to the estimates of the main variables of interest, dummy variables, the negative 
coefficients of merger dummies indicate that acquiring firms reduce their labour demand in 
comparison to non-acquiring firms, depending on output and wages. The merger dummy variable 
indicates that the immediate effect of mergers on employment is to reduce the demand for labour 
by about 8.5% during the event year in merging firms in comparison to other non-merging firms. 
Although these results are consistent with the previous research findings, the size of the derived 
decline in labour demand is smaller: both Conyon et al. (2002) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) 
report that UK public takeovers reduce labour demand by about 12% during the merger year.  
Table 3 Short-run labour demand effect of mergers 
Dependent variable: Employment
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
Employment (t-1) 0.677*** 0.677*** 0.843*** 0.678***  
Wages (t) -0.273** -0.270** -0.071 -0.273**   
Wages (t-1) 0.166* 0.164* -0.002 0.167*    
Output (t) 0.774*** 0.774*** 0.517*** 0.772***  
Output (t-1) -0.417*** -0.418*** -0.371*** -0.416***  
Merger (t) -0.085***                 
Related (t) -0.098***                 
Unrelated (t) -0.068*                 
Hostile (t) -0.081*                 
Friendly (t) -0.082***                 
Layoff (t) -0.113**   
Non-layoff (t) -0.065**   
Interaction of Year and Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -1.483*** -1.483*** -0.288 -1.480***  
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.86 0.88 0.98 0.87
Sargan test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen test p-value 0.33 0.21 0.65 0.40
No. of observations 4127 4127 4127 4127
No. of firms 705 705 705 705 Not
es: The dependent variable is employment. The estimation method is the one step SYSTEM GMM, using heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 9.2 provides the definitions of the variables. 
30 
Due to the existence of synergy and cost savings opportunities arising as a result of related 
mergers, these mergers should reduce labour demand more than unrelated mergers. Consistent 
with this prediction, the results indicate that the decline in labour demand is higher in related 
acquisitions (9.8%) than in unrelated acquisitions (6.8%). Conyon et al. (2002) and Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2004) show that related mergers reduce employment by more than unrelated mergers. 
However, Amess et al. (2008) report that the magnitude of the labour demand reduction is the 
same for both related and unrelated mergers: related mergers reduce employment by 15.8% and 
unrelated merger reduce employment by 15.5%.  
Hostile takeovers may also result in a larger decrease in labour demand, because 
management disciplining may lead to efficiency improvement in labour usage. However, the 
results indicate that the magnitude of the labour demand reduction in hostile and friendly 
acquisitions is almost the same: hostile takeovers cause an 8.2% drop in labour usage in 
comparison to non-merging control firms, while friendly mergers cause an 8.1% drop in labour 
demand. This could be due to the small number of hostile takeovers in the sample.      
Finally, we investigate whether there is a differential effect on labour demand of the 
acquisitions that involve employee layoffs and acquisitions that do not involve employee layoffs. 
Empirical evidence on this issue is important in understanding the reasons for employee layoffs: 
whether managers cut employment costs to cover takeover premiums or to eliminate duplicative 
activities that arise due to business combinations. As the results show, the employee layoff-
involving acquisitions reduce labour demand by nearly twice (11.3%) as much as those 
acquisitions that do not involve employee layoffs (6.5%). 
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1.4.2 The long-run labour demand impact of mergers 
Consistent with the dynamic labour demand theory, labour demand adjustments may take up to 
several years to materialise. As reported in Table 4, the results show that mergers reduce labour 
demand by 8.7% two years after mergers. However, the long-run coefficients of related versus 
unrelated and hostile versus friendly dummy variables are insignificant, although in some cases 
they are negative and very large. In contrast to this, layoff-involving acquisitions continue to 
adjust their employment levels in the long run by reducing labour demand by another 17.8% after 
two years following acquisitions, while the non-layoff sub-sample mergers’ long-run 
employment effect is insignificant. 
These results are consistent with prior research. For example, the results of Conyon et al. 
(2004)  show that mergers reduce labour demand by about 2% during the second year after 
mergers. Conyon et al. (2002) report that related mergers reduce derived labour demand every 
year by 6.8% for two years after mergers, while the effect of unrelated mergers is insignificant. 
1.4.3 Labour demand effect of mergers by firm size 
Previous research shows that there is significant variation in the firm performance effect of 
mergers depending on firm size: the effect of mergers is less pronounced in large firms than in 
small firms (McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001; Conyon et al., 2002). 
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Table 4 Long-run labour demand effect of mergers 
Dependent variable: Employment
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
Employment (t-1) 0.854*** 0.861*** 0.854*** 0.855***  
Wages (t) -0.06 -0.053 -0.066 -0.04
Wages (t-1) 0.01 -0.009 0.01 -0.009
Output (t) 0.467*** 0.463*** 0.455*** 0.463***  
Output (t-1) -0.325*** -0.330*** -0.312*** -0.328***  
Merger (t) -0.099***                 
Merger (t-1) 0.008                 
Merger (t-2) -0.087***                 
Related (t) -0.116***                 
Related (t-1) 0.006                 
Related (t-2) -0.02                 
Unrelated (t) -0.072*                 
Unrelated (t-1) 0.015                 
Unrelated (t-2) -0.174                 
Hostile (t) -0.106**                 
Hostile (t-1) 0.145                 
Hostile (t-2) -0.017                 
Friendly (t) -0.100***                 
Friedly (t-1) -0.035                 
Friendly (t-2) -0.11                 
Layoff (t) -0.134***  
Layoff (t-1) -0.057
Layoff (t-2) -0.178*    
Non-layoff (t) -0.061**   
Non-layoff (t-1) 0.07
Non-layoff (t-2) 0.005
Interaction of Year and 
Industry dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.373 -0.315 -0.398 -0.322
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.39
Sargan test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen test p-value 0.87 0.88 0.81 0.89
No. of observations 3469 3469 3469 3469
No. of firms 705 705 705 705
Not
es: The dependent variable is employment. The estimation method is the one step SYSTEM GMM, using heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 9.2 provides the definitions of the variables. 
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To analyse the role of the size factor in the labour demand effect of mergers, we divide the 
overall sample into two sub-groups according to the firm size distribution: large firm and small 
firm sub-groups. We use median employment to divide the sample into two sub-samples
14
. Table 
5 reports the results of estimating the equation 6.1 separately for the two firm size sub-samples to 
investigate the short-run employment effect of mergers. Consistent with the Conyon et al. (2002) 
findings, the results show that smaller firms derive higher levels of efficiency improvement in 
labour usage than large firms. In the large firms sub-sample the merger dummy coefficient is not 
significant, while in the small firms sub-sample the results indicate that mergers reduce labour 
demand by 12.6%. Thus mergers lead to a higher level of efficiency improvement in small firms 
than in larger firms.  
Table 5 Short-run labour demand effect by firm size distribution  
Dependent variable: Employment
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6 model7 model8
Employment (t-1) 0.971*** 0.971*** 0.974*** 0.982***  0.820*** 0.823*** 0.821*** 0.821***  
Wages (t) -0.703*** -0.702*** -0.699*** -0.680***  -0.063 -0.067 -0.061 -0.063
Wages (t-1) 0.662*** 0.662*** 0.660*** 0.652***  0.06 0.063 0.059 0.061
Output (t) 0.911*** 0.912*** 0.903*** 0.886***  0.421*** 0.421*** 0.419*** 0.410***  
Output (t-1) -0.882*** -0.883*** -0.877*** -0.867***  -0.283** -0.286** -0.283** -0.273**   
Merger (t) -0.017                 -0.126***                 
Related (t) -0.017                 -0.174***                 
Unrelated (t) -0.017                 -0.038                 
Hostile (t) -0.019                 -0.108                 
Friendly (t) -0.018                 -0.129***                 
Layoff (t) -0.025 -0.183**   
Non-layoff (t) -0.015 -0.103**   
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.009 -0.01 -0.007 -0.01 -0.465 -0.447 -0.458 -0.469
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.87 0.83 0.84 0.87
Sargan test p-value 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen test p-value 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.35
No. of observations 2065 2065 2065 2065 2062 2062 2062 2062
No. of firms 353 353 353 353 352 352 352 352
Large firms (upper half) Small firms (lower half)
Not
es: The dependent variable is employment. The estimation method is the one step SYSTEM GMM, using heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 9.2 provides the definitions of the variables. 
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 Here we report the results for the short-run effect  
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The same picture emerges with related and unrelated acquisitions – the effect of mergers on 
labour demand is stronger in small firms than in large firms. In this case only related acquisitions 
cause lower labour demand. The size distribution effect is insignificant in the case of hostile 
takeovers, possibly due to the small number of hostile takeovers in the sample. The size 
distribution of friendly takeovers also indicates a differential effect of mergers, which is 
consistent with the general picture described above.  
When mergers are classified into layoff and non-layoff acquisitions, both the layoff and 
non-layoff dummies indicate that small firms reduce labour demand during the merger year, but 
not in the long run. Small acquisitions involving employee layoffs reduce labour demand three 
times more than large acquisitions involving employee layoffs. In comparison to this the effect of 
non-layoff acquisitions is approximately the same for the two size distributions and neither small 
nor large acquirers adjust labour usage in the long run. 
In sum, the reported results of mergers’ effect on labour demand are similar to those 
presented by Conyon et al. (2002), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) and Amess et al. (2008), although 
the size of the employment decline is different. This could be due to the difference in sample or 
the use of different estimation methods in different samples. For example, Conyon et al. (2002) 
use Generalized Instrumental Variable Estimation after first differencing (GIVE), while Gugler 
and Yurtoglu (2004) use the one step difference GMM. The contemporaneous effect of mergers 
indicates that there is synergy between the operations of merging firms. The long-run labour 
demand reductions indicate that it takes some time to materialize merger-related synergy. 
1.4.4 Wage effects of mergers 
We analysed two possible sources of wage change after mergers: mergers’ ceteris paribus effect 
on wages due to changes in the wage formation process and the possibility of wage increase due 
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to improvement in employee profitability, as suggested by Conyon et al. (2004). First, mergers 
may immediately alter the wage formation process by introducing structural changes in rent 
sharing among different stakeholders. The underlying source of this immediate impact of mergers 
could also be the fact that mergers may induce immediate efficiency in labour usage, resulting 
from elimination of duplicative activities. This effect of mergers is confirmed by the labour 
demand analysis (discussed above): in the short run mergers significantly reduce labour demand.  
The second source of wage change depends on the long-term profitability change in 
merging firms, resulting from long-run organisational restructuring and operating performance 
rationalisations. The Conyon et al. (2004) results show that mergers improve employee 
profitability. As a result of improved profitability, employees should be able to increase their 
share in the enhanced profit. If mergers cause profit enhancement that only benefit shareholders, 
leaving the employee share unchanged, then this supports one form of Shleifer and Summers’ 
(1988) ‘breach of trust’ argument: employees work harder after mergers, but receive the same 
wages as before mergers. We test the contemporaneous effect of mergers and improved employee 
profitability on wages by estimating equation 6.2, which includes both employee profitability and 
merger dummies. The results are given in Table 6.  
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Table 6 Wage effect of mergers  
Deapendent variable: Wage
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6 model7 model8
Wage (t-1) 0.490** 0.832*** 0.793*** 0.796***  0.481** 0.824*** 0.780*** 0.785***  
Industry average wage (t) 0.380* 0.145* 0.150** 0.157**   0.525** 0.214** 0.229*** 0.246***  
Employment (t-1) -0.021** -0.009* 0.008 0.005 -0.018** -0.007 0.035 0.033
Capital per employee (t-1) -0.020** -0.017*** -0.022** -0.020***  -0.003 -0.012 -0.020* -0.015
Profit per employee (t) 0.094*** 0.052*** 0.066*** 0.061***  0.095*** 0.055*** 0.078*** 0.073***  
Merger (t-1) 0.036                 0.023                 
Merger (t-2) 0.049*                 0.023                 
Merger (t-3) 0.098**                 0.083                 
Related (t-1) -0.224                 -0.253                 
Related (t-2) 0.001                 -0.026                 
Related (t-3) -0.003                 -0.026                 
Unrelated (t-1) 0.368                 0.379                 
Unrelated (t-2) 0.06                 0.026                 
Unrelated (t-3) 0.128                 0.079                 
Merger (t-1) 0.047                 0.006                 
Merger (t-2) 0.194                 0.311                 
Merger (t-3) -0.028                 -0.072                 
Friendly (t-1) 0.018                 0.008                 
Friendly (t-2) -0.019                 -0.081                 
Friendly (t-3) 0.086                 0.076                 
Layoff (t-1) -0.082 -0.11
Layoff (t-2) 0.024 -0.015
Layoff (t-3) -0.043 -0.07
Non-layoff (t-1) 0.129*    0.115*
Non-layoff (t-2) 0.059 0.046
Non-layoff (t-3) 0.138**   0.112*    
Interaction of Year and 
Industry dummies
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.396 0.083 0.036 0.031 -0.029 0.015 -0.448 -0.451
AR(1) 0.000 0.037 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.030 0.006 0.006
AR(2) 0.685 0.994 0.292 0.895 0.641 0.953 0.423 0.939
Sargan test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen test p-value 0.092 0.212 0.300 0.271 0.074 0.451 0.539 0.631
No. of observations 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485
No. of firms 695 695 695 695 695 695 695 695 Not
es: The dependent variable is wage. The estimation method is the one step SYSTEM GMM, using heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 9.2 provides the definitions of the variables. 
The lagged dependent variable – wage is positive and highly significant. As expected, wage 
growth is strongly positively associated with average industry wage growth. Similarly, employee 
profitability is positively associated with the wage change: the higher the employee profitability, 
the higher the increase in wages. However, the effect of the second source of mergers is not clear: 
there is no evidence indicating that wages grow faster in merging firms due to increased profit 
per employee, as indicated by the insignificant interaction of the profitability variable with the 
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post-merger dummy. Although the interaction term between profitability and merger dummy is 
positive, it is not significant. 
The results indicate the clear impact of mergers on wage formation through structural 
changes: mergers on average increase wages by 4.9% two years after mergers and 9.8% three 
years after mergers, when they are considered as homogenous. However, when year and merger 
dummies are included these coefficients become insignificant. Both relatedness and hostility 
dummy variables indicate that there is no significant difference in wage growth. Wage growth is 
higher in ‘non-layoff’ sub-sample acquisitions than in ‘layoff’ sub-sample acquisitions. This 
could be explained by the fact that layoff sub-sample firms are underperforming firms and 
therefore wage growth is lower than the wage growth in ‘non-layoff’ sub-sample firms, which are 
assumed to be highly profitable both before and after acquisitions. 
1.5 Conclusions 
The value-creation theory suggests that most takeovers are motivated by the desire to gain 
synergies resulting from the combination of two businesses, or to discipline underperforming 
management. According to this theory, mergers should reduce the derived labour demand, 
controlling for wages and output. Also employee profitability should be improved, enabling 
employees to earn higher salaries after mergers. Decline in labour demand should be greater in 
acquisitions that involve layoffs than in acquisitions that do not. 
The results of this analysis show that mergers significantly reduce the derived labour 
demand during the merger year. In the merger year merging firms experience 10% decline in 
labour demand. Furthermore, the results reveal that mergers cause long-run adjustment in the use 
of labour input: mergers reduce labour demand by another 9% two years after completion of such 
transactions.   
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The difference between the performance of  related versus unrelated mergers indicates the 
existence of a wider scope for synergy in the former: during the merger year decrease in labour 
demand is larger in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions, while in the long run 
neither related nor unrelated acquisitions change labour demand. However, both hostile and 
friendly mergers lead to approximately the same size of labour demand reduction in both the 
short and the long run. Thus we conclude that merger-related synergy is one of the main sources 
of decline in labour demand. 
One of the main contributions of this chapter is that it provides further evidence showing 
that employee layoffs are motivated by merger-related efficiency improvements in labour usage. 
The results show that the derived decline in labour demand is greater in ‘layoff’ acquisitions than 
in ‘non-layoff’ acquisitions: short-run decline in labour demand is greater in the former case than 
in the latter case, while in the long run only ‘layoff’ acquisitions cause lower labour demand, 
while ‘non-layoff’ acquisitions do not change labour demand. The preliminary analysis also 
indicates that the layoff-making acquirers’ output significantly declines during the post-merger 
years, whereas non-layoff-making acquirers’ output volume increases significantly during the 
post-merger years. This indicates that layoffs were undertaken at least to arrest further 
deterioration in firm performance. 
Furthermore, the results show that mergers accelerate wage growth: wage growth in 
merging firms is higher by 5% two years after the merger completion year and 10% three years 
after the merger completion year. Neither the relatedness nor the hostility classification reveals 
any difference in wage growth, but classification of mergers into ‘layoff’ and ‘non-layoff’ sub-
samples reveals a significant difference between the wage growths in these two sub-samples. 
‘Non-layoff’ acquirers’ wage growth is significantly higher than the wage growth in non-merging 
firms, while ‘layoff’ acquirers’ wage growth is not different from the wage growth in non-
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merging firms. This confirms the view that employee layoffs are undertaken in firms with 
financial and operational difficulties. 
Overall, the results of this chapter do not show a significant adverse effect of mergers on 
employees, taking into consideration both long-run employment and wage growth after mergers. 
The absolute number of employees does not fall, but acquiring firms achieve efficiency in labour 
usage. At the same time, mergers benefit employees by accelerating their wage growth. 
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